최신 main pull

.env

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-# Google OAuth 설정
-GOOGLE_ID=whs.imnya.ng@gmail.com

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ jobs:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v4
 
       - name: Install uv
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v6
+        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v4
         with:
           enable-cache: true
           cache-dependency-glob: "uv.lock"
@@ -27,10 +27,6 @@ jobs:
       - name: Install dependencies
         run: uv sync
 
-      - name: Set up environment variables
-        run: |
-          echo "GOOGLE_ID=bot.imnya.ng@gmail.com" > .env
-
       - name: Start application and run proxy test
         run: |
             # Start the application in background
@@ -41,12 +37,7 @@ jobs:
             sleep 5
             
             # Test proxy functionality
-            sudo cp ~/.mitmproxy/mitmproxy-ca-cert.pem /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/mitmproxy-ca-cert.crt
+            curl -x http://localhost:11080 http://example.com
-            sudo update-ca-certificates
-
-            mkdir data
-            echo https://github.com > ./data/target.dump
-            curl -k -x https://localhost:11080 "https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize?client_id=Ov23lixietSCQOHxPvcr&redirect_uri=http://localhost:8787&scope=read:user+user:email&response_type=code&code_challenge=abc123&code_challenge_method=S256"
             
             # Clean up
             kill $APP_PID

.gitignore

@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@ wheels/
 # Virtual environments
 .venv
 
-.env
-
 data/
 
 

README.md

@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
 # 환경 설정
 
-## Python Virtual Environment
-
 이 프로젝트는 [uv](https://docs.astral.sh/uv/getting-started/installation/)라는 Python 패키지 관리자를 사용하여 설정해야합니다.
 
 uv 설치 후 다음과 같은 명령어를 입력합니다.
@@ -10,33 +8,8 @@ uv 설치 후 다음과 같은 명령어를 입력합니다.
 uv sync
 ```
 
-## Environment
-
 venv와 패키지가 설치가 됩니다.
 
-.env.example을 복사하여 .env를 붙여넣습니다.
-
-`GOOGLE_ID=`에 봇에서 쓸 구글 계정의 전체 GMail을 기입합니다.
-
-입력하지 않는다면 Google OAuth시 자동적으로 넘어가지 않을 수도 있습니다.
-
----
-
-> [oauth-backend](https://github.com/j93es/oauth-backend) 프록시를 사용한다면 이 가이드에 따라 인증서 또한 설정되어야만 합니다.
->
-> 그렇지 않으면 실행되지 않습니다.
->
-> 윈도우 환경에서는 `sudo  certutil -addstore root mitmproxy-ca-cert.cer`로 인증합니다.
->
-> Sudo가 활성화되어있지 않은 환경에서는 관리자로 상향된 쉘에서 실행합니다.
->
-> MacOS 환경에서는 `sudo security add-trusted-cert -d -p ssl -p basic -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain ~/.mitmproxy/mitmproxy-ca-cert.pem`으로 인증합니다.
->
-> 다른 플렛폼은 수동으로 설정되어야만 합니다.
-> https://docs.mitmproxy.org/stable/concepts/certificates/
-
----
-
 # 실행 방법
 
 ```
@@ -44,51 +17,46 @@ uv run main.py
 ```
 
 이러면 http(s)://localhost:11080로 서버가 열리게 됩니다.
-http://localhost:11081로 백엔드 서버가 열리게 됩니다.
 
 # 기여 방법
 
 `./addon/init.py`
 
 ```py
-...
+from example_check import Example
-    async def request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow):
+
-        if false_true_varifing_task.is_verifing_false_true():
+class LoggerAddon:
-            return
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.checker = Example()
+
+    def request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow): # 비동기가 필요할 경우 async def로 할 것
+            self.checker.test(flow)
+    def response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow): # 비동기가 필요할 경우 async def로 할 것
+        self.checker.test(flow)
 
-        tasks = [
-            try_catch(self.google_login_hint.request(flow)) if self.google_login_hint else None,
-            try_catch(PKCEDowngradeChecker().test(flow)),
-            try_catch(Example().test(flow))
-        ]
-        await asyncio.gather(*tasks)
-    ...
 ```
 
 `./addon/example.py`
 
 ```py
-from lib.report_vuln import report_vuln
+import lib.target as target
+from lib.report import save_report
 
 class Example:
     async def test(self, flow):
+        req = flow.request
+        method = req.method
         url = req.pretty_url
 
         # data/report.csv에 저장
-        report_vuln(
+        report_data = [{
-            title="PKCE Plain Method",
+            'target': target.load(),
-            desc="PKCE method is set to 'plain'. Possible downgrade.",
+            'status': "CRITICAL",
-            status="CRITICAL",
+            'title': "PKCE Downgrade Vulnerability",
-            uri=url,
+            'description': "PKCE downgrade vulnerability detected! Both URLs returned authorization code.",
-        )
+            'uri': f"Original: {url}\nDowngraded: {downgraded_url}"
+        }]
+        save_report(report_data)
 ```
 
 이러한 예제를 참고하여 작성하여주세요.
-
-# 백엔드 API DOCS
-
-`uv run main.py`으로 백엔드를 실행한 후에, 다음의 url에 접속합니다.
-
-```
-http://localhost:11081/redoc
-```

addon/ScopeDetection.py

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+import lib.target as target
+from lib.report import save_report
+
+class ScopeDetection:
+    def get_scope_from_query(self, query: str) -> str | None:
+        if not query:
+            return None
+        import urllib.parse
+        parsed = urllib.parse.parse_qs(query)
+        scope_values = parsed.get("scope", [])
+        if scope_values:
+            return scope_values[0]
+        return None
+
+    async def check_scope(self, flow):
+        req = flow.request
+        res = flow.response
+
+        # req.query가 MultiDictView일 수 있으므로 문자열로 변환
+        if hasattr(req.query, "urlencode"):
+            query = req.query.urlencode()
+        else:
+            query = str(req.query) if req.query else ""
+
+        location = res.headers.get("location", "")
+
+        query_scope = self.get_scope_from_query(query)
+        location_scope = self.get_scope_from_query(location)
+
+        result = []
+        if query_scope in ["all", "*"]:
+            result.append(f"Scope value issue detected in request: {query_scope}")
+        if location_scope in ["all", "*"]:
+            result.append(f"Scope value issue detected in response location: {location_scope}")
+
+        return result if result else 0
+
+    async def test(self, flow):
+        req = flow.request
+        method = req.method
+        url = req.pretty_url
+
+        result = await self.check_scope(flow)
+
+        if result != 0:
+            report_data = [{
+                'target': target.load(),
+                'status': "WARNING",
+                'title': "OAuth scope value issue",
+                'description': f"{method} {url}: {', '.join(result)}",
+                'uri': url
+            }]
+            save_report(report_data)

addon/access_token.py

@@ -1,10 +1,23 @@
 import re
-import asyncio
+from dataclasses import dataclass, asdict
+from typing import List, Dict, Optional, Any
 
-from typing import Optional, Any
 from mitmproxy.http import HTTPFlow
-from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs
+
-from lib.report_vuln import report_vuln
+import lib.target as target
+from lib.report import save_report
+
+# 결과 리포트 저장용 데이터 클래스
+@dataclass
+class TokenLeakResult:
+    title: str
+    description: str
+    uri: str
+    status: str = "MEDIUM" # 기본 상태
+
+    def to_report(self, target_value) -> Dict[str, str]:
+        """리포트 저장 포맷(dict)으로 변환"""
+        return {"target": target_value, **asdict(self)}
 
 
 # 요청/응답에서 액세스 토큰 노출 여부를 검사하는 스캐너
@@ -13,24 +26,31 @@ class AccessTokenScanner:
     async def scan(self, flow: HTTPFlow) -> None:
         """단일 HTTPFlow(request + response)에 대해 요청과 응답을 모두 검사."""
         print(f"[TOKENDEBUG] Request URL: {flow.request.url}")
+        findings: List[TokenLeakResult] = []
 
-        async_gather = []
+        findings.extend(await self._scan_request(flow.request))
-        async_gather.append(self._scan_request(flow.request))
+        findings.extend(await self._scan_response(flow.response, flow.request.url))
-        async_gather.append(self._scan_response(flow.response, flow.request.url))
+
-        await asyncio.gather(*async_gather)
+        if findings:
+            target_value = target.load()
+            save_report([f.to_report(target_value) for f in findings])
 
     # 내부 구현
-    async def _scan_request(self, request: Any):
+    async def _scan_request(self, request: Any) -> List[TokenLeakResult]:
+        results: List[TokenLeakResult] = []
         
         print("[TOKENDEBUG] ==scan request==")
         # URL 검사
-        if self._is_implicit_flow(request.url):
+        token_result = self._extract_token(request.url)
-            print("[TOKENDEBUG] OAuth Implicit Flow detected.")
+        if token_result:
-            report_vuln(
+            token, has_bearer = token_result
-                title="Token Leak in Request URL",
+            results.append(
-                desc="취약한 Grant Type입니다 (Implicit Grant Type)",
+                TokenLeakResult(
-                status="MEDIUM",
+                    title="Token Leak in Request URL",
-                uri=request.url
+                    description=f"요청 URL에 토큰이 포함되어 있습니다 (앞 20자): {token[:20]}…",
+                    uri=request.url,
+                    status="MEDIUM" if has_bearer else "LOW"
+                )
             )
 
         # Body 검사 (텍스트 컨텐츠인 경우)
@@ -38,40 +58,54 @@ class AccessTokenScanner:
             body_text = request.get_text(strict=False)
             token_result = self._extract_token(body_text)
             if token_result:
-                report_vuln(
+                token, has_bearer = token_result
-                    title="Token Leak in Request Body",
+                results.append(
-                    desc=f"요청 본문에 토큰이 포함되어 있습니다 (앞 20자): {token_result[:20]}…",
+                    TokenLeakResult(
-                    status="LOW",
+                        title="Token Leak in Request Body",
-                    uri=request.url
+                        description=f"요청 본문에 토큰이 포함되어 있습니다 (앞 20자): {token[:20]}…",
+                        uri=request.url,
+                        status="MEDIUM" if has_bearer else "LOW"
+                    )
                 )
 
-    async def _scan_response(self, response: Optional[Any], request_url: str):
+        return results
-        if response is None:
-            return
 
+    async def _scan_response(self, response: Optional[Any], request_url: str) -> List[TokenLeakResult]:
+        if response is None:
+            return []
+
+        results: List[TokenLeakResult] = []
         print("[TOKENDEBUG] ==scan response==")
         # Location 헤더 검사 (리다이렉트)
         if location_header := response.headers.get("Location"):
             token_result = self._extract_token(location_header)
             if token_result:
-                report_vuln(
+                token, has_bearer = token_result
-                    title="Token Leak in Redirect URL (Location header)",
+                if has_bearer:
-                    desc=f"Location 헤더에 토큰이 노출되었습니다 (앞 20자): {token_result[:20]}…",
+                    results.append(
-                    status="MEDIUM",
+                        TokenLeakResult(
-                    uri=location_header,
+                            title="Token Leak in Redirect URL (Location header)",
-                )
+                            description=f"Location 헤더에 토큰이 노출되었습니다 (앞 20자): {token[:20]}…",
+                            uri=location_header,
+                        )
+                    )
 
         # Body 검사 (텍스트 컨텐츠인 경우)
         if response.content:
             body_text = response.get_text(strict=False)
             token_result = self._extract_token(body_text)
             if token_result:
-                report_vuln(
+                token, has_bearer = token_result
-                    title="Token Leak in Response Body",
+                if has_bearer:
-                    desc=f"응답 본문에 토큰이 노출되었습니다 (앞 20자): {token_result[:20]}…",
+                    results.append(
-                    status="LOW",
+                        TokenLeakResult(
-                    uri=request_url,
+                            title="Token Leak in Response Body",
-                )
+                            description=f"응답 본문에 토큰이 노출되었습니다 (앞 20자): {token[:20]}…",
+                            uri=request_url,
+                        )
+                    )
+
+        return results
 
     # 토큰 탐지 키워드드
     _TOKEN_KEYS = [
@@ -81,6 +115,8 @@ class AccessTokenScanner:
         "refreshtoken",
         "auth_token",
         "session_token",
+        "secret_token",
+        "ssoauth",
     ]
 
     # "bearer" 표시가 동시에 존재할 때만 토큰으로 판단하여 false positive를 줄임
@@ -114,38 +150,6 @@ class AccessTokenScanner:
             if (m := pattern.search(text)) and m.group(1):
                 print(f"[TOKENDEBUG] token: {m.group(1)}")
                 print(f"[TOKENDEBUG] has_bearer: {has_bearer}")
-                if has_bearer:
+                return m.group(1), has_bearer
-                    return m.group(1)
         print("[TOKENDEBUG] No matched.")
         return None
-
-    def _is_implicit_flow(self, request_url: str) -> bool:
-        """
-        URL의 파라미터에서 OAuth Implicit Flow 패턴을 체크합니다.
-        
-        Args:
-            request_url: 체크할 요청 URL
-            
-        Returns:
-            bool: client_id, redirect_uri, response_type이 모두 존재하고 
-                response_type 값이 'token'인 경우 True, 그렇지 않으면 False
-        """
-        try:
-            parsed_url = urlparse(request_url)
-            query_params = parse_qs(parsed_url.query)
-            
-            # 필요한 파라미터들이 모두 존재하는지 확인
-            required_params = ['redirect_uri', 'response_type']
-            
-            for param in required_params:
-                if param not in query_params:
-                    return False
-            
-            # response_type 값이 'token'인지 확인
-            response_type_values = query_params.get('response_type', [])
-            
-            # response_type 파라미터가 존재하고 값 중에 'token'이 있는지 확인
-            return 'token' in response_type_values or 'id_token' in response_type_values
-            
-        except Exception:
-            return False

addon/cleintsecret_check.py

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+# clientsecret_check.py
+from mitmproxy import http
+from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs
+from typing import List
+import lib.target as target
+from lib.report import save_report
+
+
+class ClientSecretChecker:
+    def is_oauth_uri(self, uri: str) -> bool:
+        qs = parse_qs(urlparse(uri).query)
+        keys = qs.keys()
+        return "client_id" in keys and ("client_secret" in keys or "client_secret" in uri)
+
+    def has_client_secret_in_uri(self, uri: str) -> bool:
+        qs = parse_qs(urlparse(uri).query)
+        return "client_secret" in qs
+
+    def is_post_with_client_secret(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> bool:
+        if flow.request.method != "POST":
+            return False
+        content_type = flow.request.headers.get("Content-Type", "")
+        if "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" in content_type:
+            body = parse_qs(flow.request.get_text())
+            return "client_secret" in body
+        return False
+
+    def is_exposed_in_referer(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> bool:
+        referer = flow.request.headers.get("Referer", "")
+        return "client_secret" in referer
+
+    def check_client_secret_leak(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> List[str]:
+        messages = []
+
+        if self.has_client_secret_in_uri(flow.request.url):
+            messages.append("client_secret found in URL query string")
+
+        if self.is_post_with_client_secret(flow):
+            messages.append("client_secret found in POST body")
+
+        if self.is_exposed_in_referer(flow):
+            messages.append("client_secret exposed in Referer header")
+
+        return messages
+
+    def _report(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow, issues: List[str], direction: str):
+        desc = " | ".join(issues)
+        report_data = [{
+            'target': target.load(),
+            'status': "HIGH",
+            'title': f"OAuth Client Secret Exposure ({direction})",
+            'description': desc,
+            'uri': flow.request.url,
+        }]
+        save_report(report_data)
+        print(f"[INFO] Client Secret Leak Detected ({direction}): {desc}")
+
+    def request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
+        try:
+            if not self.is_oauth_uri(flow.request.url):
+                return
+            issues = self.check_client_secret_leak(flow)
+            if issues:
+                self._report(flow, issues, "request")
+        except Exception as e:
+            print(f"[ERROR] Client Secret Check (request) failed: {e}")
+
+    def response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
+        try:
+            if not self.is_oauth_uri(flow.request.url):
+                return
+            issues = self.check_client_secret_leak(flow)
+            if issues:
+                self._report(flow, issues, "response")
+        except Exception as e:
+            print(f"[ERROR] Client Secret Check (response) failed: {e}")

addon/client_secret.py

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-from lib.report_vuln import report_vuln
-from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs
-
-class ClientSecret:
-    def get_target_from_query(self, query: str, target: str) -> str | None:
-        if not query:
-            return None
-        parsed = parse_qs(query)
-        scope_values = parsed.get(target, [])
-        if scope_values:
-            return scope_values[0]
-        return None
-
-    async def test(self, flow):
-        req = flow.request
-        
-        parsed = urlparse(req.pretty_url)
-        query = parsed.query
-
-        query_client_id = self.get_target_from_query(query, "client_id")
-        query_client_secret = self.get_target_from_query(query, "client_secret")
-        
-        if query_client_id and query_client_secret:
-            report_vuln(
-                title="OAuth Client Secret Exposure",
-                desc=f"Client ID and Secret found in request: {query_client_id}, {query_client_secret}",
-                status="CRITICAL",
-                uri=req.pretty_url
-            )

addon/csrf_check.py

@@ -1,17 +1,26 @@
 # csrf_check.py
-from mitmproxy import http
+from mitmproxy import http, ctx
 from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs, unquote
 import httpx
 from typing import Optional, Union, List
 
-from lib.report_vuln import report_vuln
+import lib.target as target
-from lib.utils.is_oauth_uri import is_oauth_uri
+from lib.report import save_report
 
 class CsrfChecker:
     nonce_params = {
-        "state", "nonce", "csrf_token", "csrf"
+        "state", "nonce", "as", "frame_id", "csrf_token", "csrf"
     }
 
+    def is_oauth_uri(self, uri: str) -> bool:
+        qs = parse_qs(urlparse(uri).query)
+        qs_keys = [*qs]
+        
+        if "client_id" in qs_keys and any(p in qs_keys for p in (
+                "redirect_uri", "response_type", "grant_type", "scope", "state", "nonce")):
+            return True
+        return False
+
     def get_header(self, headers: http.Headers, name: str) -> Optional[str]:
         # mitmproxy Headers는 case-insensitive
         raw = headers.get(name)
@@ -31,7 +40,7 @@ class CsrfChecker:
     def is_oauth_redirect(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> bool:
         code = flow.response.status_code
         loc = self.get_header(flow.response.headers, "location") or ""
-        return 300 <= code < 400 and is_oauth_uri(loc)
+        return 300 <= code < 400 and self.is_oauth_uri(loc)
 
     def check_nonce_in_request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> bool:
         qs = parse_qs(urlparse(flow.request.url).query)
@@ -65,7 +74,7 @@ class CsrfChecker:
 
     def check_redirect_nonce(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> Union[List[str], int]:
         # ① OAuth URI, ② 요청에 nonce, ③ 리다이렉트 응답
-        if not (is_oauth_uri(flow.request.url)
+        if not (self.is_oauth_uri(flow.request.url)
                 and self.check_nonce_in_request(flow)
                 and self.is_oauth_redirect(flow)):
             return 0
@@ -76,29 +85,18 @@ class CsrfChecker:
         resp_nonce = self.get_query_param(loc, param) if param else None
 
         if resp_nonce is None:
-            report_vuln(
+            return ["Missing nonce in redirect"]
-                title="CSRF Risk", 
-                desc="Missing nonce in redirect response", 
-                status="CRITICAL", 
-                uri=flow.request.url
-            )
-            return 1
         if orig_nonce != resp_nonce:
-            report_vuln(
+            return ["Nonce mismatch request↔response"]
-                title="CSRF Risk", 
-                desc="Nonce mismatch request↔response", 
-                status="HIGH", 
-                uri=flow.request.url
-            )
-            return 1
 
         return 0
 
     async def check_nonce_reuse(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> Union[int, List[str]]:
         # OAuth Request가 아니면서, OAuth 리다이렉트 응답인 경우만 검사
-        if is_oauth_uri(flow.request.url) or not self.is_oauth_redirect(flow):
+        if self.is_oauth_uri(flow.request.url) or not self.is_oauth_redirect(flow):
             return 0
         
+
         loc0 = self.get_header(flow.response.headers, "location") or ""
         param = self.find_nonce_param(loc0) or "state"
         qs0 = parse_qs(urlparse(loc0).query)
@@ -113,16 +111,10 @@ class CsrfChecker:
         if new_nonce is None:
             return 0
         if new_nonce == orig_nonce:
-            report_vuln(
+            return ["Nonce reused without cookies"]
-                title="CSRF Risk", 
-                desc="Nonce reused without cookies", 
-                status="CRITICAL", 
-                uri=flow.request.url
-            )
-            return 1
 
         # (2) 두 번의 리다이렉트 비교
-        async with httpx.AsyncClient(follow_redirects=True) as cli:
+        async with httpx.AsyncClient(follow_redirects=False) as cli:
             # 원본 쿼리
             req1 = await cli.get(loc0, params=qs0, headers=flow.request.headers)
             # nonce 교체 쿼리
@@ -135,35 +127,42 @@ class CsrfChecker:
             and urlparse(req1.headers.get("location", "")).path
             == urlparse(req2.headers.get("location", "")).path
         ):
-            report_vuln(
+            return ["Identical redirects on nonce swap → potential CSRF"]
-                title="CSRF Risk", 
-                desc="Identical redirects on nonce swap → potential CSRF", 
-                status="NOT-VERIFIED-HIGH", 
-                uri=flow.request.url
-            )
-            return 1
 
         return 0
 
     async def response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
         try:
+            msgs: List[str] = []
 
             # 1) 요청에 nonce 없으면
-            if is_oauth_uri(flow.request.url) and not self.check_nonce_in_request(flow):
+            if self.is_oauth_uri(flow.request.url) and not self.check_nonce_in_request(flow):
-                report_vuln(
+                msgs.append("Missing state/nonce in request")
-                    title="CSRF Risk", 
-                    desc="Missing nonce in OAuth request", 
-                    status="CRITICAL", 
-                    uri=flow.request.url
-                )
-                return
 
             # 2) 리다이렉트에서 nonce 검사
             r1 = self.check_redirect_nonce(flow)
+            if r1:
+                msgs.extend(r1 if isinstance(r1, list) else [])
 
             # 3) nonce 재사용 검사
             r2 = await self.check_nonce_reuse(flow)
+            if r2:
+                msgs.extend(r2 if isinstance(r2, list) else [])
 
+            if msgs:
+                desc = " | ".join(msgs)
+                status = "MEDIUM"
+                report_data = [{
+                    'target': target.load(),
+                    'status': status,
+                    'title': "CSRF Risk",
+                    'description': desc,
+                    'uri': flow.request.url,
+                }]
+                save_report(report_data)
+                print(f"[INFO] CSRF Check: {desc}")
+            else:
+                pass
         except Exception as e:
             print(f"[ERROR] CSRF Check failed: {e}")
             return

addon/google_login_hint.py

@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-import os
-from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs, urlencode, urlunparse
-from dotenv import load_dotenv
-
-# .env 파일 로드
-load_dotenv(override=True)
-
-class GoogleLoginHint:
-    def __init__(self):
-        self.google_id = os.getenv('GOOGLE_ID', '')
-        if not self.google_id:
-            print("⚠️  Warning: GOOGLE_ID not found in .env file")
-    
-    async def request(self, flow):
-        """Google OAuth 요청을 가로채서 login_hint를 추가하거나 수정"""
-        req = flow.request
-        url = req.pretty_url
-        
-        # Google OAuth 인증 URL인지 확인
-        if self._is_google_oauth_url(url):
-            print(f"🔍 Google OAuth URL detected: {url}")
-            
-            # URL 파싱
-            parsed_url = urlparse(url)
-            query_params = parse_qs(parsed_url.query)
-            
-            # login_hint 추가 또는 수정
-            if self.google_id:
-                query_params['login_hint'] = [self.google_id]
-                print(f"✅ Added/Updated login_hint: {self.google_id}")
-                
-                # 새로운 쿼리 스트링 생성
-                new_query = urlencode(query_params, doseq=True)
-                
-                # 새로운 URL 생성
-                new_url = urlunparse((
-                    parsed_url.scheme,
-                    parsed_url.netloc,
-                    parsed_url.path,
-                    parsed_url.params,
-                    new_query,
-                    parsed_url.fragment
-                ))
-                
-                # 요청 URL 수정 - URL과 호스트 모두 업데이트
-                flow.request.url = new_url
-                print(f"🔄 Modified URL: {new_url}")
-                
-    def _is_google_oauth_url(self, url):
-        """Google OAuth URL인지 확인"""
-        google_oauth_domains = [
-            'accounts.google.com',
-            'oauth2.googleapis.com'
-        ]
-        
-        parsed_url = urlparse(url)
-        domain = parsed_url.netloc.lower()
-        
-        # Google OAuth 도메인 확인
-        for google_domain in google_oauth_domains:
-            if google_domain in domain:
-                # OAuth 관련 경로 확인
-                path = parsed_url.path.lower()
-                if any(oauth_path in path for oauth_path in ['/oauth2', '/auth', '/login']):
-                    return True
-        
-        return False

addon/google_response_type_token.py

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-from lib.report_vuln import report_vuln
-import httpx
-from lib.utils.is_oauth_uri import is_oauth_uri
-from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs
-
-class GoogleResponseTypeToken:
-    def get_taregt_from_query(self, query: str, target: str) -> str | None:
-        if not query:
-            return None
-        parsed = parse_qs(query)
-        scope_values = parsed.get(target, [])
-        if scope_values:
-            return scope_values[0]
-        return None
-
-    async def test(self, flow):
-        req = flow.request
-        
-        if not is_oauth_uri(req.pretty_url):
-            return
-        
-        if req.pretty_host != "accounts.google.com":
-            return
-        
-        if "response_type=token" in req.pretty_url:
-            return
-        
-        url = f"{req.pretty_url}".replace("response_type=code", "response_type=token")
-        
-        async with httpx.AsyncClient(follow_redirects=True) as cli:
-            response = await cli.request(
-                method=req.method,
-                url=url,
-                headers=req.headers,
-                content=req.get_content(),
-            )
-
-            
-        if response.status_code >= 400:
-            return
-        
-        if "<b>400.</b>" in response.text:
-            return
-        
-        if "response_type=token" in str(response.url):
-            report_vuln(
-                "Google Response Type Token",
-                f"Response type token allowed in {req.pretty_url}",
-                "HIGH",
-                str(response.url)
-            )
-            

addon/init.py

@@ -1,93 +1,109 @@
 from mitmproxy import http
 import asyncio
 from pkce_check import PKCEDowngradeChecker
-from addon.scope_detection import ScopeDetection
+from ScopeDetection import ScopeDetection
 from csrf_check import CsrfChecker
-from client_secret import ClientSecret
+from nonce_check import NonceChecker
-from addon.open_redirect_check import OpenRedirectChecker
+from cleintsecret_check import ClientSecretChecker
+from redirect_uri_check import RedirectBypassChecker
 from access_token import AccessTokenScanner
-from addon.google_login_hint import GoogleLoginHint
-from addon.google_response_type_token import GoogleResponseTypeToken
-import os
-from dotenv import load_dotenv
-from lib.utils.try_catch import try_catch
-from lib.false_true_varifing_task import FalseTrueVarifingTask
 
-# Initialize the singleton task manager
+class PKCEAddon:
-false_true_varifing_task = FalseTrueVarifingTask()
+    def __init__(self):
-
+        self.checker = PKCEDowngradeChecker()
-load_dotenv(override=True)
-
-_open_redirect_checker = OpenRedirectChecker()
-
-class AddonBase:
-    """
-    Base class for addons.
-    Each addon should implement its own request or response method.
-    """
-    
-    def __init__(self) -> None:
-        if os.getenv('GOOGLE_ID'):
-            self.google_login_hint = GoogleLoginHint()
-        else:
-            self.google_login_hint = None
-
-    def should_ignore(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> bool:
-        """Check if the request should be ignored."""
-        ignore_domains = [
-            ".googleapis.com",
-            "android.clients.google.com",  # Added missing comma here
-            ".adtrafficquality.google",
-            ".googlesyndication.com",
-            "cdn.jsdelivr.net",
-            "update.googleapis.com",
-            ".google-analytics.com",
-            ".gstatic.com"
-        ]
-        # Ignore .googleapis.com domains
-        for domain in ignore_domains:
-            if domain in flow.request.pretty_host:
-                return True
-        
-        # Ignore static files (JS, CSS, fonts, images, etc.)
-        # Split on '?' to remove query parameters before checking extension
-        path = flow.request.path.split('?')[0].lower()
-        static_extensions = [
-            '.js', '.css', '.woff2', '.woff', '.ttf', '.otf', '.svg',
-            '.png', '.jpg', '.jpeg', '.gif', '.webp', '.ico', '.bmp',
-            '.tiff', '.tif', '.webm', '.mp4', '.avi', '.mov', '.pdf', '.md',
-            '.txt', '.csv'
-        ]
-        
-        if any(path.endswith(ext) for ext in static_extensions):
-            return True
-            
-        return False
 
     async def request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow):
-        if self.google_login_hint:
+        print(
-            await try_catch(self.google_login_hint.request(flow))
+            f"[DEBUG] Processing request: {flow.request.method} {flow.request.pretty_url}"
+        )
+        try:
+            await self.checker.test(flow)
+        except Exception as e:
+            print(f"[ERROR] Addon failed: {e}")
+            pass
             
-        if false_true_varifing_task.is_verifing_false_true():
-            return
             
-        tasks = [
+class CsrfAddon:
-            try_catch(PKCEDowngradeChecker().test(flow)),
+    def __init__(self):
-        ]
+        self.checker = CsrfChecker()
-        await asyncio.gather(*tasks)
 
     async def response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow):
-        if false_true_varifing_task.is_verifing_false_true() or self.should_ignore(flow):
+        try:
-            return
+            await self.checker.response(flow)
+        except Exception as e:
+            print(f"[ERROR] CSRF Addon failed: {e}")
+            pass
         
-        tasks = [
-            try_catch(CsrfChecker().response(flow)),
-            try_catch(ScopeDetection().test(flow)),
-            try_catch(ClientSecret().test(flow)),
-            try_catch(AccessTokenScanner().scan(flow)),
-            try_catch(GoogleResponseTypeToken().test(flow)),
-            try_catch(_open_redirect_checker.test(flow)),
-        ]
-        await asyncio.gather(*tasks)
         
-addons = [AddonBase()]
+class ScopeAddon:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.checker = ScopeDetection()
+        self._flow_map = {}  # 요청 정보를 저장
+
+    async def request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow):
+        self._flow_map[flow.id] = {
+            "method": flow.request.method,
+            "url": flow.request.pretty_url,
+            "query": flow.request.query,
+        }
+
+    async def response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow):
+        try:
+            await self.checker.test(flow)
+        except Exception as e:
+            print(f"[ERROR] ScopeDetection failed: {e}")
+
+class NonceAddon:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.checker = NonceChecker()
+
+    async def response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow):
+        try:
+            pass
+            # TODO id_token을 파싱하는 부분이 누락되어있습니다.
+            # await self.checker.check_nonce_in_id_token(flow)
+        except Exception as e:
+            print(f"[ERROR] NonceAddon failed: {e}")
+            pass
+        
+class ClientSecretAddon:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.checker = ClientSecretChecker()
+
+    async def request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow):
+        try:
+            self.checker.request(flow)
+        except Exception as e:
+            print(f"[ERROR] ClientSecretAddon request failed: {e}")
+            pass
+        
+    async def response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow):
+        try:
+            self.checker.response(flow)
+        except Exception as e:
+            print(f"[ERROR] ClientSecretAddon response failed: {e}")
+            pass      
+
+class AccessTokenAddon:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.checker = AccessTokenScanner()
+
+    async def response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow):
+        try:
+            await self.checker.scan(flow)
+        except Exception as e:
+            print(f"[ERROR] AccessToken Addon failed: {e}")
+            pass
+
+class RedirectBypassAddon:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.checker = RedirectBypassChecker()
+
+    # request 대신 response 로 바꿔 보세요:
+    async def response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow):
+        try:
+            await self.checker.test(flow)
+        except Exception as e:
+            print(f"[ERROR] RedirectBypass Addon failed: {e}")
+
+addons = [PKCEAddon(), ScopeAddon(), CsrfAddon(), NonceAddon(), ClientSecretAddon(), AccessTokenAddon(), RedirectBypassAddon()]

addon/nonce_check.py

@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 import jwt
 from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs
 from typing import Union
+import httpx
 
-from lib.report_vuln import report_vuln
+import lib.target as target
+from lib.report import save_report
 
 class NonceChecker:
     def is_oidc_flow(self, flow) -> bool:
@@ -70,13 +72,17 @@ class NonceChecker:
     def check_nonce_in_id_token(self, flow, id_token: str) -> bool:
         decoded = self.decode_id_token(id_token)
         nonce = decoded.get("nonce")
+        req = flow.request
+        url = req.pretty_url
         if not nonce:
-            report_vuln(
+            report_data = [{
-                title="Nonce Check Failed",
+                'target': target.load(),
-                desc="id_token에 nonce가 없습니다.",
+                'status': "CRITICAL",
-                status="HIGH",
+                'title': "nonce is missing in id_token",
-                uri=flow.request.url
+                'description': "Nonce is present in the request but missing in the id_token.",
-            )
+                'uri': f"Original: {url}\nDecoded ID Token: {decoded}",
+            }]
+            save_report(report_data)
             return False
         else:
             return True

addon/pkce_check.py

@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
 from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs, urlencode, urlunparse
+import asyncio
 import httpx
 from typing import Dict, List
-from lib.report_vuln import report_vuln
+
+import lib.target as target
+from lib.report import save_report
 
 
 class PKCEDowngradeChecker:
@@ -55,19 +58,27 @@ class PKCEDowngradeChecker:
 
     async def report_missing_parameters(self, url: str, is_openid: bool):
         status = "MEDIUM" if is_openid else "LOW"
-        report_vuln(
+        self.save(
-            title="PKCE Parameters Missing",
+            [
-            desc="PKCE parameters are missing or incomplete.",
+                self.make_report(
-            status=status,
+                    status,
-            uri=url,
+                    "PKCE Parameters Missing",
+                    "PKCE parameters are missing or incomplete.",
+                    url,
+                )
+            ]
         )
 
     async def report_plain_method(self, url: str):
-        report_vuln(
+        self.save(
-            title="PKCE Plain Method",
+            [
-            desc="PKCE method is set to 'plain'. Possible downgrade.",
+                self.make_report(
-            status="CRITICAL",
+                    "CRITICAL",
-            uri=url,
+                    "PKCE Plain Method",
+                    "PKCE method is set to 'plain'. Possible downgrade.",
+                    url,
+                )
+            ]
         )
 
     def create_downgraded_url(self, parsed, query):
@@ -139,11 +150,15 @@ class PKCEDowngradeChecker:
         else:
             return  # Likely safe
 
-        report_vuln(  
+        self.save(
-            title=title,
+            [
-            desc=description,
+                self.make_report(
-            status=status,
+                    status,
-            uri=f"Original: {original_url}\nDowngraded: {downgraded_url}",
+                    title,
+                    description,
+                    f"Original: {original_url}\nDowngraded: {downgraded_url}",
+                )
+            ]
         )
 
     def same_redirect_destination(self, orig_loc, down_loc):
@@ -151,3 +166,16 @@ class PKCEDowngradeChecker:
         down = urlparse(down_loc)
         return orig.netloc == down.netloc and orig.path == down.path
 
+    def make_report(
+        self, status: str, title: str, description: str, uri: str
+    ) -> Dict[str, str]:
+        return {
+            "target": target.load(),
+            "status": status,
+            "title": title,
+            "description": description,
+            "uri": uri,
+        }
+
+    def save(self, report_data: List[Dict[str, str]]):
+        save_report(report_data)

addon/redirect_uri_check.py

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+from mitmproxy import http
+import aiohttp
+from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs, urlencode, urlunparse  
+import lib.target as target  
+from lib.report import save_report 
+
+class BypassPayload:
+    """ 우회 패턴 정의 """
+    def __init__(self, name: str, mutate_func, description: str):
+        self.name = name
+        self.mutate = mutate_func #우회 url 만드는 함수
+        self.description = description
+
+
+class RedirectBypassChecker:
+    def __init__(self):
+        """ 우회 페이로드 목록 """
+        self.bypass_payloads = [
+            BypassPayload(
+                name=r"@",
+                mutate_func=self._mutate_pattern1,
+                description=r"@ 기호를 이용한 호스트 우회 공격: evil.com@target.com"
+            ),
+            
+        ]
+        self.session = None
+
+    """ 우회 URL 생성 목록 """
+    # 1. @
+    def _mutate_pattern1(self, original: str) -> str:
+        parsed = urlparse(original)
+        mutated = f"https://evil.com@{parsed.netloc}{parsed.path}"
+        print(f"[redirect_uri_check] original: {original} → mutated: {mutated}")
+        return mutated
+
+    '''aiohttp 세션 생성 (재사용)'''
+    async def _get_session(self):
+        if self.session is None:
+            timeout = aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=10)
+            self.session = aiohttp.ClientSession(timeout=timeout)
+        return self.session
+
+    '''세션 정리'''
+    async def close_session(self):
+        if self.session:
+            await self.session.close()
+            self.session = None
+
+    """ 우회된 URL에 GET 요청을 보내고, 서버 응답 정보 반환 """
+    async def _send_request(self, url, headers=None):
+        try:
+            session = await self._get_session() # 세션 준비
+            request_headers = headers or {} # 요청 헤더 설정 - headers가 주어지지 않았다면 빈 딕셔너리 사용
+            
+            # 서버에 GET 요청 전송 
+            async with session.get(url, allow_redirects=False, headers=request_headers) as response:
+                return {
+                    'status': response.status,
+                    'location': response.headers.get("Location", ""),
+                    'headers': dict(response.headers)
+                }
+        except Exception as e:
+            print(f"[ERROR] 요청 실패 ({url}): {e}")
+            return {'status': 500, 'location': '', 'headers': {}}
+
+    """ redirect_uri가 기준 도메인(baseUrl)에 속하는지 판단 """
+    def _is_baseline_valid(self, redirect_uri: str, base_url: str) -> bool:
+        try:
+            redirect_parsed = urlparse(redirect_uri)
+            base_parsed = urlparse(base_url)
+            
+            redirect_host = redirect_parsed.hostname
+            base_host = base_parsed.hostname
+            
+            if not redirect_host or not base_host:
+                return False
+            
+            if "@" in redirect_uri:
+                if redirect_host != base_host:
+                    print(f"[ALERT] 우회 공격 탐지: {redirect_host} != {base_host}")
+                    return False
+                
+                at_parts = redirect_uri.split('@')
+                if len(at_parts) > 1:
+                    before_at = at_parts[0]
+                    if '//' in before_at:
+                        potential_domain = before_at.split('//')[-1]
+                        if '.' in potential_domain and potential_domain != base_host:
+                            print(f"[CRITICAL] @ 우회 공격: {potential_domain}@{base_host}")
+                            return False
+            
+            is_valid = (redirect_host == base_host or redirect_host.endswith(f".{base_host}"))
+            return is_valid
+            
+        except Exception as e:
+            print(f"[ERROR] 도메인 검증 실패: {e}")
+            return False
+        
+    """ Location 헤더에서 authorization code 추출 """    
+    def _extract_code_from_location(self, location: str) -> str:
+        if not location:
+            return ""
+        
+        try:
+            parsed = urlparse(location)
+            query = parse_qs(parsed.query)
+            return query.get('code', [''])[0]
+        except:
+            return ""
+
+    """ 메인 테스트 함수 - mitmproxy flow 처리 """
+    async def test(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow):
+        url = flow.request.pretty_url
+        parsed = urlparse(url)
+        query = parse_qs(parsed.query)
+
+        if "redirect_uri" not in query:
+            return
+
+        original_redirect_uri = query["redirect_uri"][0]
+        print(f"[DEBUG] 원본 redirect_uri: {original_redirect_uri}")
+
+        for payload in self.bypass_payloads:
+            try:
+                await self._test_bypass_pattern(
+                    url, query, parsed, original_redirect_uri, payload, headers={}
+                )
+            except Exception as e:
+                print(f"[ERROR] 우회 패턴 테스트 실패 ({payload.name}): {e}")
+                continue
+
+    """ 개별 우회 패턴 테스트 """
+    async def _test_bypass_pattern(self, original_url, query, parsed_url, original_redirect_uri, payload, headers):
+        
+        print(f"[SCAN] 우회 패턴 테스트: {payload.name}")
+        
+        # 우회 URL 생성
+        bypassed_uri = payload.mutate(original_redirect_uri)
+        
+        # 새로운 쿼리 파라미터 구성
+        modified_query = query.copy()
+        modified_query["redirect_uri"] = [bypassed_uri]
+        new_query_string = urlencode(modified_query, doseq=True)
+        test_url = urlunparse(parsed_url._replace(query=new_query_string))
+        
+        # 요청 전송
+        response = await self._send_request(test_url, headers)
+
+        # 응답 분석
+        await self._analyze_response(original_url, test_url, bypassed_uri, response, payload)
+
+    """ 응답 분석 및 취약점 판단 """
+    async def _analyze_response(self, original_url, test_url, bypassed_uri, response, payload):
+        status = response['status']
+        location = response['location']
+        
+        # 리다이렉트 응답이 아니면 스킵
+        if status not in [301, 302, 303, 307, 308]:
+            return
+            
+        # Location 헤더에서 code 추출
+        auth_code = self._extract_code_from_location(location)
+        
+        if auth_code and not self._is_baseline_valid(bypassed_uri, original_url):
+            # 취약점 발견 시에만 로그
+            print(f"[🎯 VULNERABILITY] {payload.name} 우회 성공!")
+            await self._report_vulnerability(original_url, test_url, bypassed_uri, location, auth_code, payload)
+
+
+    """ 취약점 보고서 생성 """
+    async def _report_vulnerability(self, original_url, test_url, bypassed_uri, location, auth_code, payload):
+        # payload가 문자열인지 객체인지 확인
+        if hasattr(payload, 'name'):
+            pattern_name = payload.name
+            pattern_description = payload.description
+        else:
+            pattern_name = str(payload)
+            pattern_description = "Unknown bypass pattern"
+            
+        description = (
+            f"Redirect URI 우회 취약점 발견!\n\n"
+            f"-- 상세 정보 --:\n"
+            f"• 우회 패턴: {pattern_name}\n"
+            f"• 설명: {pattern_description}\n"
+            f"• 원본 URL: {original_url}\n"
+            f"• 우회된 redirect_uri: {bypassed_uri}\n"
+            f"• 테스트 URL: {test_url}\n"
+            f"• 리다이렉트 위치: {location}\n"
+            f"• 발급된 인가 코드: {auth_code[:10]}...\n\n"
+        )
+        
+        report_data = [{
+            "target": target.load(),
+            "status": "CRITICAL",  
+            "title": "Redirect URI Bypass Vulnerability",
+            "description": description,
+            "uri": test_url  # uri 필드 추가
+        }]
+        
+        save_report(report_data)
+        print(f"[🎯 CRITICAL] Redirect URI 우회 취약점 발견 및 보고 완료!")
+        print(f"[INFO] 패턴: {pattern_name}, 우회 URI: {bypassed_uri}")

addon/scope_detection.py

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-from lib.report_vuln import report_vuln
-from lib.utils.is_oauth_uri import is_oauth_uri
-from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs
-
-class ScopeDetection:
-    def get_scope_from_query(self, query: str) -> str | None:
-        if not query:
-            return None
-        parsed = parse_qs(query)
-        scope_values = parsed.get("scope", [])
-        if scope_values:
-            return scope_values[0]
-        return None
-
-    async def test(self, flow):
-        if not is_oauth_uri(flow.request.pretty_url):
-            return
-        
-        req = flow.request
-
-        parsed = urlparse(req.pretty_url)
-        query = parsed.query
-
-        query_scope = self.get_scope_from_query(query)
-
-        if query_scope in ["all", "*"]:
-            report_vuln(
-                title="OAuth Scope Value Issue",
-                desc=f"Scope value issue detected in request: {query_scope}",
-                status="WARNING",
-                uri=req.pretty_url
-            )

lib/false_true_varifing_task.py

@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-from typing import Any
-from copy import deepcopy
-
-class FalseTrueVarifingTask:
-    """
-    A singleton class representing a task that can be either false or true.
-    This class is used to handle tasks that require verification of their truth value.
-    """
-    
-    _instance = None
-
-    def __new__(cls):
-        if cls._instance is None:
-            cls._instance = super(FalseTrueVarifingTask, cls).__new__(cls)
-            cls._instance._initialized = False
-        return cls._instance
-
-    def __init__(self):
-        if self._initialized:
-            return
-        self._is_verifing = False
-        self.task_queue = []
-        self._initialized = True
-
-    def reset(self):
-        """
-        Reset the task queue and verification status.
-        """
-        self._is_verifing = False
-        self.task_queue.clear()
-        
-    # 각 addon의 검증 로직에서 해당 함수를 호출하여, 추후 오탐 검증을 위한 작업을 추가할 수 있습니다.
-    # TODO: 모델 지정해두기
-    def add_task(self, task_name: str, initial_uri: str, data: Any):
-        """
-        Add a task to the task queue.
-        :param task: The task to be added.
-        """
-        self.task_queue.append(
-            {
-                "task_name": task_name,
-                "initial_uri": initial_uri,
-                "data": data
-            }
-        )
-        
-    def start_verification(self):
-        """
-        Start the verification process for the tasks in the queue.
-        """
-        self._is_verifing = True
-    
-    def get_task_queue(self):
-        """
-        Get a copy of the current task queue.
-        :return: A copy of the task queue.
-        """
-        return deepcopy(self.task_queue)
-        
-    def is_verifing_false_true(self):
-        """
-        Get the current verification status.
-        :return: True if verification is in progress, False otherwise.
-        """
-        return self._is_verifing

lib/report.py

@@ -1,17 +1,15 @@
 # save as data/report.csv
 import os
 import csv
-from mitmproxy import http
+from typing import List, Dict, Any
-import lib.cur_target_url as cur_target_url
 
 # target, status, title, description, uri
 
 # file path는 'data/report.csv'로 고정
-def report_vuln(title: str, desc: str, status: str, uri: str) -> None:
+def save_report(report_data: List[Dict[str, Any]], file_path: str = 'data/report.csv') -> None:
-    file_path: str = 'data/report.csv'
-    
     os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(file_path), exist_ok=True)
     
+
     """
     report_data 안의 각 레포트를 한 줄씩 CSV에 추가로 저장합니다.
     파일이 없으면 헤더를 먼저 쓰고, 있으면 레코드만 이어서 씁니다.
@@ -25,10 +23,10 @@ def report_vuln(title: str, desc: str, status: str, uri: str) -> None:
         if not file_exists:
             writer.writeheader()
 
-        writer.writerow({
+        for row in report_data:
-            'target': cur_target_url.load(),
+            # None 방지 & 줄바꿈 이스케이프
-            'status': status,
+            escaped = {
-            'title': title,
+                k: str(v).replace('\n', '\\n') if v is not None else ''
-            'description': desc,
+                for k, v in row.items()
-            'uri': uri,
+            }
-        })
+            writer.writerow(escaped)

lib/utils/is_oauth_uri.py

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs
-
-def is_oauth_uri(uri: str) -> bool:
-    qs = parse_qs(urlparse(uri).query)
-    qs_keys = [*qs]
-    
-    if "client_id" in qs_keys and any(p in qs_keys for p in (
-            "redirect_uri", "response_type", "grant_type", "scope", "state", "nonce")):
-        return True
-    return False

lib/utils/try_catch.py

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-async def try_catch(coro):
-    try:
-        return await coro
-    except Exception as e:
-        print(f"[ERROR] {coro} failed: {e}")

main.py

@@ -1,23 +1,21 @@
 from runner.proxy import run_proxy
+import subprocess
 import threading
-import uvicorn
-from runner.backend import app
-
-def run_fastapi_server():
-    """FastAPI 서버를 실행하는 함수"""
-    uvicorn.run(app, host="localhost", port=11081, log_level="info")
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
-    try:
+    # Start web server in a separate thread
-        # FastAPI 서버를 백그라운드 스레드에서 실행
+    server_process = subprocess.Popen([
-        fastapi_thread = threading.Thread(target=run_fastapi_server, daemon=True)
+        "granian",
-        fastapi_thread.start()
+        "--interface", "asgi",
-        print("🚀 FastAPI server started on http://localhost:11081")
+        "--host", "0.0.0.0",
+        "--port", "11081",
+        "--loop", "asyncio",
+        "--reload",
+        "runner.backend:app",
+    ])
     
-        # Run mitmdump proxy (메인 스레드에서 실행)
+    try:
-        print("🛡️  Starting mitmdump proxy on port 11080...")
+        # Run mitmdump proxy
         run_proxy()
-    except KeyboardInterrupt:
-        print("🛑 Shutting down...")
     finally:
-        print("✅ Mitmdump proxy has been stopped.")
+        server_process.terminate()

runner/backend/__init__.py

@@ -1,107 +1,17 @@
 from fastapi import FastAPI, Query, HTTPException
 from fastapi.responses import Response
-import lib.cur_target_url as cur_target_url
+import lib.target as target
-from lib.false_true_varifing_task import FalseTrueVarifingTask
-from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
-from lib.report_vuln import report_vuln as save_vuln
-
-# Initialize the singleton task manager
-false_true_varifing_task = FalseTrueVarifingTask()
 
 app = FastAPI()
 
 
-
+@app.post("/start")
-@app.post(
+async def start(url: str = Query(None)):
-    "/start",
+    if url:
-    summary="취약점 검증을 위한 대상 URL 설정",
+        target.save(url)
-    description="""
+        print(f"Target URL set to: {url}")
-이 엔드포인트는 시스템이 취약점 검증 작업에 사용할 대상 URL을 설정합니다.
+        return {"message": f"Target URL set to: {url}"}
-
+    return {"error": "No URL provided"}
-유효한 URL이 제공되면:
-- 해당 URL이 저장됩니다.
-- 검증 작업 큐가 초기화됩니다.
-- 새로운 검증 작업을 시작할 준비가 완료됩니다.
-
-URL이 제공되지 않으면, 오류가 반환됩니다.
-"""
-,
-    tags=["1st STEP"]
-)
-async def start(url: str = Query(..., description="The URL to target for vulnerability verification")):
-    cur_target_url.save(url)
-    false_true_varifing_task.reset()
-    return {"message": f"Target URL set to: {url}"}
-
-
-
-
-
-
-@app.post(
-    "/start-false-true-verifing",
-    summary="시스템에 오탐 검증 작업 시작을 알림",
-    description="""
-이 엔드포인트는 시스템에 오탐 검증 작업이 시작되었음을 알립니다.
-또한 시스템은 미리 준비된 오탐 검증 작업 목록을 반환합니다.
-
-```json
-{
-    "payload": [
-        {
-            "task_name": "pkce_task",                   # 검증 작업의 이름
-            "initial_uri": "http://auth.example.com",   # browser가 처음 접속할 URI
-            "data": any                                 # 추가 데이터
-        },
-        ...
-    ]
-}
-```
-""",
-    tags=["2nd STEP"]
-   )
-async def start_false_true_verifing():
-    false_true_varifing_task.start_verification()
-    task_queue = false_true_varifing_task.get_task_queue()
-    return {"payload": task_queue}
-    
-
-
-
-
-
-class VulnerabilityReport(BaseModel):
-    title: str = Field(..., description="Short title for the vulnerability")
-    url: str = Field(..., description="URL where the vulnerability was discovered")
-    status: str = Field(..., description="Status of the vulnerability (e.g., VERIFIED-CRITICAL)")
-    desc: str = Field(..., description="Detailed description of the issue")
-
-@app.post(
-    "/report-vuln",
-    summary="취약점 보고",
-    description="""
-정탐인 취약점을 시스템에 보고합니다.  
-보고 시 다음 정보를 포함해야 합니다:
-
-- **title**: 취약점의 간단한 이름
-- **url**: 취약점이 발견된 위치 (URL)
-- **status**: 심각도
-- **desc**: 취약점에 대한 상세 설명
-""",
-    tags=["3rd STEP"]
-)
-async def report_vuln(vuln: VulnerabilityReport):
-    save_vuln(
-        title=vuln.title,
-        desc=vuln.desc,
-        status=vuln.status,
-        uri=vuln.url
-    )
-    
-    return {"message": "Vulnerability reported successfully"}
-
-
-
 
 
 @app.exception_handler(404)